



Vladimir Putin, Campaign 
Finance Reform, and the Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment 
John T. Valauri ∗ 
If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that 
the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the 
Government over the people.1 
 
This is an Article occasioned by the Supreme Court’s important 
campaign finance reform decision in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission.2  But unlike most other articles with which it shares this 
genesis, it is not mainly about that case.  Instead, this Article takes on 
a broader concern and examines and decries the drift away from 
traditional and foundational First Amendment and other 
constitutional doctrine, and the slouching toward more egalitarian 
and managerial notions of free speech and democratic government, 
for which the McConnell opinion is an avatar. 
In contrast to other critiques of campaign finance reform, I 
hope to do more than just raise free speech objections.  That sort of 
approach has two main faults—it needlessly limits the purchase and 
force of one’s critical arguments and it invites easy counterpunching 
replies.  The complaint that campaign finance reform measures 
unduly restrict free speech will receive the reply (for example, from 
Justice Breyer) that money is not speech (or, at least, is not just 
speech) and that, even if it is, the need to protect governmental and 
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 1 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison).  This line is also 
quoted twice by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the United States Supreme Court 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275, 282 (1964). 
 2 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (largely upholding against constitutional challenge the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
[hereinafter BCRA], also known as the McCain–Feingold Act) (to be codified 
primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.). 
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electoral integrity justifies the restrictions.3  A truer measure of the 
relative merit and weight of the arguments on both sides of the 
campaign finance reform issue requires a wider perspective than the 
one provided by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment4 
alone.  It requires a perspective that spans the breadth of the entire 
Constitution because the campaign finance reform that Congress has 
given us and which the Supreme Court has largely upheld is 
inconsistent with popular self-rule—the republican form of 
government that the Constitution establishes.5 
Granted, the Guarantee Clause6 itself assures only the states a 
republican form of government.  But while not stated in the same 
form,7 such a requirement on the federal level was both intended by 
the Framers8 and put into the Constitution itself in provisions such as 
the Preamble9 and the Free Speech, Assembly, and Petition Clauses of 
the First Amendment.10 Would it not be a very strange thing if the 
 
 3 Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, stated in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC: 
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign 
is a matter of First Amendment concern—not because money is speech 
(it is not); but because it enables speech. . . . 
On the other hand, restrictions upon the amount any one 
individual can contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the 
electoral process—the means through which a free society 
democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental 
action. 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400–01 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); see also infra note 14. 
 4 “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 5 The Court has itself, at times, recognized this broader perspective, for example 
in saying, “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government.”  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). 
 6 “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government[.]”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 7 For, if it were, the federal government would be guaranteeing itself a 
republican form of government. 
 8 As it was, for example, by James Madison in the headnote to this Article.  See 
supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 9 The Preamble to the United States Constitution provides: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 10 “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the 
  
2005 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 579 
Constitution guaranteed only the states, but not the nation, a 
republican form of government? 
I do not offer a full definition or description of a republican 
form of government because I do not need one for my purposes 
here.11  But I do mean, at least, to include the idea behind Madison’s 
aphorism introducing this Article, that, in a republic, the “censorial 
power,” along with other aspects of self-government, belongs to the 
people and not to their representatives.12 
But a republican form of government is not a pure or direct 
democracy; it is, instead, a representative democracy.13  This is the 
reason that the censorial power is so important: it is needed to ensure 
that the people and not their representatives rule.  Any weakening of 
this power threatens and undermines the popular self-rule so critical 
to the republican form of government.  If we were a direct rather 
than a representative democracy (like ancient Athens or a New 
England town meeting), the people’s censorial power would lack this 
importance, for the right would then only be that of the people to 
criticize themselves.  I belabor this point because the egalitarian 
proponents of campaign finance reform sometimes act and talk as if 
we had a direct democracy here in the United States.14  This manifests 
 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 11 The Supreme Court itself has held the matter, in some aspects, to be a 
nonjusticiable political question.  For example, in Luther v. Borden, the Court 
specifically found: 
[A]ccording to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every 
State resides in the people of the State, and . . . they may alter and 
change their form of government at their own pleasure.  But whether 
they have changed it or not by abolishing an old government, and 
establishing a new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the 
political power.  And when that power has decided, the courts are 
bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it. 
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47 (1849). 
 12 The censorial power here is nothing more than the power to command or 
regulate.  So, the meaning of Madison’s statement in the headnote to this Article is 
only that in the United States the people command the government and not the 
reverse.  But the fundamental postulate of popular sovereignty that this embodies is 
crucial to the central meaning of the First Amendment and to our system of 
government generally. 
 13 On this score, Vincent Blasi reminds us that “Article One, the Republican 
Form of Government Clause, and the Seventeenth Amendment guarantee to the 
People of the United States and of the individual states that they shall be governed by 
representatives.”  Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why 
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1281, 1283 (1994). 
 14 Speech is relatively easy and inexpensive in a direct democracy, such as a town 
meeting.  But in a large, representative democracy like our own, communication is 
cumbersome and expensive.  If political expenditures and contributions there are 
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itself, as we will see, not just in their disvaluing of the censorial power, 
but also in their penchant for managerial and parliamentary tropes 
for political and electoral debate.15  Their misguided conception of 
American democracy also causes these proponents to overlook the 
fact that in elections within a representative democracy, most citizens 
participate (if at all), not as speakers, but as listeners and financial 
contributors. 
I proffer the notion of self-government by the people as the 
touchstone of our constitutional form of government, one that 
cannot be impinged upon or denied whatever the purported benefit.  
That done, I argue that campaign finance reform as it has been 
theorized, practiced, and defended by its contemporary proponents 
violates this basic notion of self-government by displacing the 
“censorial power” away from the people to the federal government.  
For as Madison said in another context, “[a]n interpretation that 
destroys the very characteristic of the Government cannot be just.”16 
How is it that wiser, more experienced heads than mine seem 
largely to have overlooked this touchstone of self-government?  There 
are two explanations.  First, it is hidden in plain sight, but in our 
clause-bound world of constitutional interpretation, larger, more 
basic considerations often escape notice.17  Purpose is rarely explicit 
in what we do, but if we interpret rightly, it is always implicit. Take, 
for example, Philip Bobbitt’s standard typology of constitutional 
 
limited, speech, too, will suffer.  Of the debate over whether money is speech, Justice 
Breyer says, “Money is not speech, it is money.  But the expenditure of money 
enables speech; and that expenditure is often necessary to communicate a message, 
particularly in a political context.  A law that forbids the expenditure of money to 
convey a message could effectively suppress that communication.”  Stephen Breyer, 
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 252 (2002). 
 15 Those who would limit campaign finance and electoral expression in the name 
of political equality of voters or civic education inevitably violate Madison’s proviso 
by casting government in a managerial role overseeing and regulating political 
debate.  And, as Robert Post notes, “The question of whether election speech should 
be characterized as within such a managerial domain, or instead as within public 
discourse, is a question that affects the meaning and scope of public discourse.”  
Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 
1840 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
 16 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (remarks of Rep. Madison in 
consideration of a bill to establish the Bank of the United States). 
 17 However, on occasion, justices do refer to constitutional foundations.  For 
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995), begins, “We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a 
Federal Government of enumerated powers.”  Id. at 552. 
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argument.18  The touchstone of popular self-government is not one of 
Bobbitt’s five types of argument (history, text, structure, prudence, 
and doctrine), but it is present as the reason or justification for these 
types.  They maintain the censorial power of the people while 
they inhibit its usurpation by the government.  Second, throughout 
American history there have been relatively few serious challenges to 
our republican form of government.  That is, in part, why I chose a 
wide range of examples in both place and time, from the Sedition Act 
in the 1790’s to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan19 to contemporary 
Russia, to elucidate the fundamental importance of self-government 
in thinking about campaign finance reform, the central meaning of 
the First Amendment, and the Constitution generally.  My task here 
will be as much one of reorientation and refocusing of perspective as 
it will be one of argument and persuasion.  The argument will take us 
to Vladimir Putin’s Russia as well as to John Adams’ America in 
addition to the more familiar forum of modern Supreme Court 
decisions, but always for the same purpose of demonstrating the 
fundamental importance of the touchstone of self-government in 
thinking about campaign finance reform, the central meaning of the 
First Amendment, and the Constitution generally. 
VLADIMIR PUTIN AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
Let me start by comparing two seemingly unrelated events that 
took place in the second week of December 2003.  One, the Court’s 
decision in McConnell, has an obvious link to our subject.  The other, 
the legislative election in Russia, does not.  Both events, however, are 
related to my topic. 
On Sunday, December 7, 2003, Russia held parliamentary 
elections in which United Russia, the party supporting Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, inflicted a resounding defeat on the 
opposition parties,20 although outside observers questioned the 
fairness of the process.21  The New York Times editorial writers seemed 
 
 18 Bobbitt divides constitutional argument into five forms: historical, textual, 
structural, prudential, and doctrinal.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 
(1982). 
 19 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (striking down libel judgment won by public official on 
free speech and free press grounds). 
 20 The New York Times story on the election stated, “Mr. Putin’s party crushed the 
Communists and ousted all but a handful of liberal democrats from Parliament, 
capturing the most votes of any party in any election since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.”  Steven Lee Myers, Putin Revels in Election; Others See Flaws, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A10. 
 21 The New York Times detailed the report of two European election monitoring 
groups, which concluded that the election “called into question Russia’s willingness 
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determined to put the best possible face on things.  Though 
mentioning some shortcomings, the editors found it 
“[h]eartening . . . to see Russians voting freely” and emphasized the 
“good news” that these elections were freer than their Soviet 
predecessors.22  What they found “most troubling” was not the defects 
in the process itself, but the fact that “so many of the candidates are 
the new rich, leaving the distinct air of tycoons and oligarchs brazenly 
buying access to power—or to more wealth.”23 
The New York Times’ own columnist, William Safire, provided the 
needed corrective to this dose of editorial see-no-evil later in the week 
with an op-ed that began with the cold-water assertion that, “[b]y 
taking over the mass media and seizing the political opposition’s 
source of funds, Vladimir Putin and his K.G.B. cohort have brought 
back one-party rule to Russia.”24  Of the big-money-backed candidates, 
Safire wrote, “The money needed to organize parties and put up a 
campaign against an entrenched government came from an 
admittedly unsavory source: the rich oligarchs out to protect their ill-
gotten fortunes from confiscation by the state.”25  Safire corrected his 
editors’ opinion that the election was, on balance, a plus for 
democracy, and the implication that moneyed influences constituted 
a bigger threat to fair and democratic elections than did one-party 
rule.26 
The second news story from that week concerned the Supreme 
Court’s landmark campaign finance reform decision in McConnell on 
December 10, three days after the Russian election.  The New York 
Times’ editors hailed the Court’s upholding of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) as “A Campaign Finance 
Triumph” that “closed two gaping loopholes in campaign finance 
law . . . [namely,] ‘soft money,’ the unlimited, and often very sizable 
contributions to political parties . . . [and] sham ‘issue ads’. . . [that] 
purported to be about political issues but were actually intended to 
help particular candidates.”27  The editors agreed with the Court that 
“Congress has broad authority in acting against the corrupting power 
 
to move towards European standards for democratic elections.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 22 Editorial, Russians Inch Toward Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at A28. 
 23 Id. 
 24 William Safire, The Russian Reversion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at A31. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 27 Editorial, A Campaign Finance Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A42. 
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of money in politics.”28  Dismissing constitutional objections to 
reform, the editorial concluded, “Now that many of the constitutional 
objections have been stripped away, Congress has a greater obligation 
than ever to address what the court’s majority called ‘the ill effects of 
aggregated wealth on our political system.’”29 
These two stories may be linked as follows: If one had to pick 
from American political history the classic use of the popular 
censorial power in the form of an insurgent political campaign, one 
could find no better example than Senator Eugene McCarthy’s 1968 
campaign against President Lyndon Johnson.  Yet, that campaign 
would not have been possible under subsequent campaign finance 
restrictions.  When interviewed in 1991, Senator McCarthy said that, 
[b]y putting a $1,000 top limit on individual campaign 
contributions, with matching funds from the federal government, 
they made it harder for an insurgent candidate to make headway.  
In 1968 we had several contributors who gave us $100,000 each.  
What I say is that there would have been no American Revolution 
if we’d been dependent on King George III for matching funds.30 
Bringing things full circle for our purposes, Senator McCarthy 
concluded, “It’s getting worse, I think.  It’s reached the point where 
it’s easier to start a new political trend, or thought, in Russia than in 
the US.”31 
The Russian election and McConnell decision, and the New York 
Times’ editorial reaction to them, turn out to have quite a lot in 
common.  Both manifest a preference for the reduction of big money 
influence in politics over a concern for free speech and other self-
government interests.  Both diminish liberty in the name of a dubious 
effort at promoting equality and combating corruption.  They 
represent, in Dr. Johnson’s memorable phrase, “the triumph of hope 
over experience.”32  And, just as Mr. Safire provided the necessary 
experiential corrective to his editors’ hope-blinded optimism about 
the Russian legislative election, I seek here to do the same 
concerning the widespread wishful thinking about campaign finance 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.)). 
 30 John Lichfield, Notebook: Square Pegs Aim for the Oval Office, INDEPENDENT 
(London), Dec. 29, 1991, at 19. 
 31 Id. 
 32 2 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 128 (George Birkbeck Hill ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1971 prtg. of 1934 ed.) (1791).  I confess that I would have used 
this as my Article’s title had I not been scooped by another campaign finance reform 
critic.  See James H. Warner, The Triumph of Hope over Experience: The Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and the First Amendment, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 
(2003). 
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reform.  As Justice Holmes famously reminded us, preservation of our 
freedom of speech (as well as of our other freedoms) requires 
“eternal[] vigilan[ce].”33  Such vigilance is not compatible with 
wishful thinking in the face of threats to our constitutional liberties. 
THE CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Madison’s censorial power maxim, introducing this Article, 
arises again as we turn to American constitutional history in order to 
explore “the central meaning of the First Amendment.”34  By “central 
meaning,” following Professor Kalven, I mean “a core of protection of 
speech without which democracy cannot function . . . [and] not the 
whole meaning of the Amendment.”35  It accounts for what Edmond 
Cahn calls “the firstness of the First Amendment”36 and it is a 
recurrent theme in the rhetoric of a diverse number of formative 
First Amendment documents and events (especially those involving 
the Sedition Act), as well as in such cases as Abrams v. United States37 
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.38 
Truth be told, the censorial power of the people was in some 
doubt during the formative period of the Constitution and the 
question came to a head when the Adams administration brought 
about the enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798,39 which criminalized 
the production of “any false, scandalous and malicious writing or 
writings against the government of the United States.”40  Despite its 
lack of defenders today, numerous historians and commentators have 
judged the act to be constitutional.41  At the time, even the great John 
Marshall spoke favorably of the act and its constitutionality.42  But the 
act’s supporters have not prevailed.43  Instead, the defense of the 
 
 33 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 34 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). 
 35 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208. 
 36 Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464, 481 (1956). 
 37 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 38 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 39 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Kalven, supra note 35, at 206 (collecting authorities). 
 42 See John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions, 6 J. HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES (VA.) 93–95 (1798–99), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 136–
39 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 43 As Justice Brennan said, writing for the Court in Sullivan, “Although the 
Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the 
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people’s censorial power by Madison and other Republicans against 
the Sedition Act became the basis for our free speech traditions. 
The Virginia Resolutions of 1798, for example, expressed worry 
that the Sedition Act claimed for the federal government “a power 
which, more than any other, ought to produce universal alarm, 
because it is levelled against the right of freely examining public 
characters and measures, and of free communication among the 
people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual 
guardian of every other right.”44  In his report on the Virginia 
Resolutions, Madison reminded his colleagues that “the right of 
electing the members of government constitutes more particularly 
the essence of a free and responsible government.  The value and 
efficacy of the right depends on . . . examining and discussing [the] 
merits and demerits of the candidates . . . .”45 
The Sedition Act itself was never the subject of constitutional 
evaluation by the Supreme Court because it expired before it could 
be challenged, but the issue of its propriety and of Madison’s notion 
of the people’s censorial power has run through a number of 
important free speech cases, among them Abrams v. United States,46 
decided just after World War I.  Abrams involved a conspiracy 
prosecution under the Espionage Act against five aliens who had 
made and distributed circulars opposing American intervention in 
Russia after the outbreak of the Russian revolution.47  The Court 
upheld the convictions, but Justice Holmes dissented: 
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the 
First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in 
force.  History seems to me against the notion.  I had conceived 
that the United States through many years had shown its 
repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . .48 
Yet, despite the Virginia Resolutions and Justice Holmes’ Abrams 
dissent, “until its disposition by the Times case, the status of the 
Sedition Act of 1798 remained an open question.”49  I turn now to 
that case in order to close the question. 
On its face, New York Times v. Sullivan is a simple libel action over 
 
day in the court of history.”  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276 (citation omitted). 
 44 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), in 4 DEBATES ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 554 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Ayer Co. 1987 
prtg. of 2d ed.) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
 45 4 id. at 575. 
 46 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 47 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617–21. 
 48 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 49 Kalven, supra note 35, at 206. 
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a newspaper advertisement that was critical of a public official, 
brought by the official against those who placed the advertisement 
and the newspaper that published it.50  But, at base, the case raises the 
same fundamental constitutional questions about self-government 
and the censorial power that aroused Madison’s ire in 1794.  At the 
heart of this simple libel action, Justice Brennan keenly  saw a threat 
to the very censorial power that had been imperiled shortly after the 
Founding by the Sedition Act and wisely framed his argument to 
address the renewed threat. 
Justice Brennan introduced his discussion of the Act by stating, 
“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public 
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by 
our decisions.”51  Relating this notion to the case at hand, he famously 
wrote, “Thus we consider this case against the background of a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”52  
After rehearsing some relevant history and precedent, the 
centerpiece of his opinion was the assertion in the Virginia 
Resolutions of 1798 that the censorial power was “the only effectual 
guardian of every other right.”53  These principles, Justice Brennan 
believed, compelled the conclusion “that the Act, because of the 
restraint it imposed upon the criticism of government and public 
officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.”54 
Applying the principles forged in the crucible of the Sedition 
Act controversy to the alleged libel in Sullivan, the Court announced, 
“What a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a 
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”55  
The Court correctly went on to hold that the censorial privilege of 
the people thus recognized extended even to honest misstatement.56 
Commentators quickly realized that Sullivan was a landmark 
opinion.  Professor Kalven, for example, asserted in an influential 
article that “[t]he exciting possibilities in the Court’s opinion derive 
 
 50 For a full statement of the facts of the case, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 256–61 (1964). 
 51 Id. at 269. 
 52 Id. at 270. 
 53 Id. at 273 (quoting Madison, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 44, at 554); see 
supra text accompanying note 44. 
 54 Id. at 276. 
 55 Id. at 277. 
 56 See id. at 278. 
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from its emphasis on seditious libel and the Sedition Act of 1798 as 
the key to the meaning of the First Amendment.”57  The significance 
of the holding was not merely the resolution of a long-standing 
question of legal history,58 but more importantly the specification by 
the Supreme Court, at long last, of the core meaning and purpose of 
the First Amendment.  Professor Kalven encapsulated that meaning 
when he commented that “[t]he touchstone of the First Amendment 
has become the abolition of seditious libel and what that implies 
about the function of free speech on public issues in American 
democracy.”59  And what are these implications?  Kalven answers this 
question, I believe, when he says, “[T]he opinion almost literally 
incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn’s thesis that in a democracy the 
citizen as ruler is our most important public official.”60 
Professor Kalven’s assertion was confirmed the following year 
when Justice Brennan gave the Alexander Meiklejohn Lecture at 
Brown University.61  In that lecture, Brennan summarized the kernel 
of Meiklejohn’s teaching on the First Amendment: “The first 
amendment, in his view, is the repository of those self-governing 
powers that, because they are exclusively reserved to the people, are 
by force of that amendment immune from regulation by the 
agencies, federal and state, that are established as the people’s 
servants.”62  Justice Brennan believed Meiklejohn would agree that 
“[f]reedom of expression in areas of public affairs is an absolute.”63  
Justice Brennan then proceeded to lay out some of the principles 
Meiklejohn had derived from this position.  Of those principles, the 
most relevant to our concerns is the principle whereby “[t]he 
revolutionary intent of the First Amendment is, then, to deny to all 
subordinate agencies authority to abridge the freedom of the 
electoral power of the people.”64  In this, Meiklejohn’s position tracks 
that of Madison and the Virginia Resolutions of 1798.65  
Unfortunately, as we will see later, Meiklejohn’s position goes beyond 
this Madisonian core to also embrace some managerial views of self-
 
 57 Kalven, supra note 35, at 204. 
 58 As Kalven puts it, “until its disposition by the Times case, the status of the 
Sedition Act of 1798 remained an open question.”  Id. at 206. 
 59 Id. at 209. 
 60 Id. 
 61 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the 
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). 
 62 Id. at 11–12. 
 63 Id. at 12. 
 64 Id. at 13 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 254). 
 65 See supra notes 1, 16, 44, 45, 53 and accompanying text. 
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government that have relevance to the campaign finance debate.66 
It is not very difficult to apply this view of the “the central 
meaning of the First Amendment” to campaign finance reform.  Nor 
does it want for expositors.  Many of the features of such a 
conception have already been noted elsewhere in Supreme Court 
opinions and law review articles.  I have merely collected them, the 
better to contemplate what one might call “campaign finance reform 
according to New York Times v. Sullivan.”  What follows is a sketch of 
some of the main points of this notion. 
In an approach to campaign finance reform that highly values 
the people’s censorial power and views it as the central meaning of 
the First Amendment, all aspects of campaign finance would be 
presumptively strongly protected activity.  While their constitutional 
protection might not be absolute,67 government restrictions on 
campaign finance activity would be strictly scrutinized.68  Although 
these precise terms were not used in Sullivan because they had not 
yet passed into common parlance, this was essentially the standard 
used by the Court when it held that defamation rules relating to 
criticism of public officials must meet an “actual malice” standard.69 
Exceptions to this standard would likewise be strictly scrutinized, 
lest they improperly discriminate based on content or viewpoint.  No 
individual or entity, rich or poor, private party or PAC, would be 
prohibited from engaging in campaign finance activity unless the 
regulations  failed the actual malice test.  This stringency would apply 
to dollar limits as well as to outright bans on various campaign 
finance activities, since both would constitute infringements of 
constitutionally protected activity.  Because of the level of scrutiny 
 
 66 For example, Justice Brennan says that “Dr. Meiklejohn’s view did not mean 
that the agencies of government had no role and that the first amendment protected 
a freedom to speak at any time and place.”  Brennan, supra note 61, at 13.  For an 
excellent exposition of these aspects of Meiklejohn’s view of free expression, see 
generally Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993). 
 67 Meiklejohn might have insisted to the contrary.  See Meiklejohn, supra note 64. 
 68 Thus, the government would bear the burden of showing that such regulations 
served a compelling interest in the least restrictive manner possible. 
 69 The Court described the “actual malice” standard as follows: 
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that 
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
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applied, no deference would be given to Congressional findings 
because such deference would be inappropriate in a strict scrutiny 
setting.  For the same reason, with respect to the evil being fought, a 
quid pro quo definition of corruption would be required since 
anything short of that would not be the least restrictive means of 
pursuing a compelling governmental interest, for only a quid pro quo 
definition of corruption would meet the “actual corruption” standard 
this view would require analogously to Sullivan’s “actual malice” 
standard.  Anything broader than that would not be narrowly enough 
tailored. 
One consequence of this approach to campaign finance 
restrictions would be that merely avoiding the appearance of 
corruption would not be a sufficiently weighty interest to justify 
limitation of protected campaign finance activity.  Such appearance is 
often in the eye of the beholder and deprivation of constitutional 
rights ought to be based on objective fact rather than subjective, 
perhaps biased, perception.  And even if objectivity were attainable 
(for example, through a reasonable person standard), there would 
remain an intractable problem with the least-restrictive-means prong 
of the test since an appearance-based standard would effectively 
disable the protection normally offered by this requirement.  Because 
strict scrutiny would be applied to campaign finance regulations, the 
government would also have to show that the measures imposed were 
the least restrictive alternatives with respect to impinging upon the 
protected activity.  As a result, in order to justify bans, limits, and 
disclosure requirements, the government would have to demonstrate 
why non-suppressive alternatives such as subsidies, vouchers, and free 
airtime would not work to achieve legislative aims.  For absent 
demonstration that non-suppressive alternatives do not work, there 
can be no showing, as strict scrutiny requires, that alternatives which 
suppress speech are truly necessary to achieve government’s 
compelling anticorruption rationale in campaign finance regulation. 
One significant result of an approach like that sketched above 
would likely be the realization of just how far the Court’s decisions 
increasingly depart from “the central meaning of the First 
Amendment.”  I will now put this notion to use by comparing it first 
to the earliest and most censorial, power-friendly modern campaign 
finance reform decision, Buckley v. Valeo,70 and then to later campaign 
finance reform cases, culminating in McConnell. 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
 
 70 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.71  The Court’s Buckley 
opinion is clearly of two minds about the Sullivan conception of the 
central meaning of the First Amendment, juxtaposing as it does 
echoes of Sullivan’s stirring rhetoric with statements that are flatly at 
odds with the Madisonian tradition in Sullivan.  This is because 
Buckley, at its core, is a compromise decision, founded upon a basic 
distinction between the constitutional protection afforded to 
campaign expenditures on the one hand, and to campaign 
contributions on the other.  The Buckley Court expressed great 
concern about the free expression consequences of the campaign 
expenditure limits there in question: 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can 
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily 
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of 
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of 
the audience reached.  This is because virtually every means of 
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the 
expenditure of money. . . . 
The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent 
substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the 
quantity and diversity of political speech. . . .72 
Only a page or so later, the Court expresses much less constitutional 
concern over contribution limitations: “By contrast with a limitation 
upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the 
amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate 
or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the 
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”73 
That the Court’s crabbed view of the constitutional protection 
for campaign contributions is inconsistent with the robust Sullivan 
conception of free expression rights is clear when contrasted with an 
assertion by Ralph Winter, co-counsel for the plaintiff in Buckley, that 
“[a] limit on the amount an individual may contribute to a political 
campaign is a limit on the amount of political activity in which he 
may engage.”74  The Buckley Court countenances what the Sullivan 
 
 71 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 
431–42 (West 2005)). 
 72 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
 73 Id. at 20. 
 74 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Money, Politics and the First Amendment, in CAMPAIGN 
FINANCES: TWO VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 45, 60 (2d 
prtg. 1972).  This statement closely tracks the Court’s view of campaign expenditures 
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Court rejects—the existence of different grades of political activity 
and different modes of criticism of public officials (and 
corresponding differences in the degree of protection for these 
activities).  So, the Buckley Court overruled the appellate court’s 
classification of contributions and expenditures as conduct rather 
than speech only in the case of expenditures.75  For the Court, this 
difference turned on the requisite level of constitutional scrutiny.76  
Lesser scrutiny will necessarily be accompanied by greater deference 
to Congress because, by definition, it is less searching than strict 
scrutiny. 
In contrast to the several distinctions propounded by the Court 
as a consequence of its constitutional analysis, the Buckley Court saw 
one main anticorruption purpose behind both the Act in question 
and its holdings.  In discussing contribution limits, for example, the 
Court said, “It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary 
purpose to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting 
from large individual financial contributions in order to find a 
constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution 
limitation.”77  Yet, in an important sense, the anticorruption purpose 
has two parts: the prevention of quid pro quo bribery78 and avoiding 
“the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of 
the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual 
financial contributions.”79  The first involves actual corruption, the 
second only the suspicion thereof. 
CORRUPTION, EQUALITY, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
Because it was an inconsistent, compromise decision, Buckley was 
subject to strong and contrary pressures.  Over time, these pressures 
have not proven to be of equal force, and the Court has been pushed 
ever farther from a Sullivan approach to campaign finance reform, as 
most recently demonstrated in McConnell.  This trend increasingly 
imperils constitutional self-rule and the people’s censorial power.  
 
rather than of contributions.  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 75 “We cannot share the view that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure 
limitations are comparable with the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien.  The 
expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of 
a draft card.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. 
 76 “Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication 
on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to 
reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 77 Id. at 26. 
 78 See id. at 26–27. 
 79 Id. at 27. 
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The reason why this is so, however, is not readily apparent from the 
Court’s opinions themselves because Buckley has not been overruled.  
The Court continues to use the same terminology, recognizing 
corruption as the primary evil to be combated by campaign finance 
reform.  But beneath the surface, a tectonic shift is occurring as the 
Court departs more and more from “the central meaning of the First 
Amendment” and adopts a more egalitarian, collectivist, and 
managerial view of the subject.  The shift here is from a libertarian 
view of the First Amendment rights involved to a more egalitarian 
view.80  A second difference between these two approaches is that the 
libertarian view is individualistic, focusing on personal liberty, while 
the egalitarian view looks more at “the people, as a collectivity.”81  As a 
result, substantial functional change in the constitutional standards 
governing campaign finance reform has come about even while the 
rules themselves have remained nominally the same.  And now with 
the passage of the BCRA, the statute in question in McConnell, the 
underlying statutory rules have changed too. 
I will not here attempt a comprehensive analysis and critique of 
McConnell, but rather will examine McConnell’s departure from “the 
central meaning of the First Amendment” and the harm that flows 
from that departure by focusing on the elusive, but central concept of 
corruption.  For this one concept circumscribes all the main 
difficulties with the now dominant constitutional forces in this area.  
The debate and disagreement over this important notion is spread 
both vertically, over the course of campaign finance decisions over 
the years, and horizontally, within the conflicting opinions and 
definitions offered by the justices in individual cases like McConnell.82 
We have already seen that Buckley itself offered twin definitions 
of corruption as quid pro quo bribery83 and as an undesirable 
 
 80 Edward B. Foley describes the contrast between the two approaches as follows: 
“The egalitarian vision wants limits on the amount of money spent on election 
campaigns in an effort to equalize the financial influence of all voters in the electoral 
process.  The libertarian vision opposes such limits on the ground that they would 
interfere with the freedom of voters to use their own money to publicize their 
political views.”  Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the Constitution, and Campaign Finance, 10 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 23 (1998). 
 81 Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1517, 1520 (1997)  (reviewing OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996)). 
 82 For a good, brief discussion of the concept of corruption and its important 
role in the campaign finance debate, see David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of 
Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 142–49. 
 83 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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appearance inhering in large contributions.84  Both notions were 
developed in subsequent cases.  In Federal Election Commission v. 
National Conservative Political Action Committee,85 for example, the Court 
struck down a presidential election spending limit because it lacked 
an adequate anticorruption basis.  This was a result of the Court 
employing the narrower of the two Buckley corruption definitions.86  If 
the Court had adopted the more expansive view, large contributions 
might well have been found to create the appearance of (in the sense 
of a potential for) corruption. 
A much broader view was taken a few years later in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce,87 a case concerning corporate 
campaign expenditures.  Setting to one side the quid pro quo 
conception of corruption, the Court said, “Michigan’s regulation 
aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that 
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”88  A later case, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC,89 involving a state election contribution limit, 
defined corruption even more expansively to include “the broader 
threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.”90 
Corruption was also an important focus of the BCRA.  After 
starting with a reaffirmation of the money–corruption linkage,91 the 
Court proceeded to expand the already broad notion of corruption.  
For example, to the notions of bribery, appearance of impropriety, 
corrosive effect, and excessive compliance, the Court now added the 
dangers of privileged access to candidates and officeholders,92 and 
 
 84 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 85 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
 86 “The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political 
favors.”  Id. at 497. 
 87 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 88 Id. at 659–60. 
 89 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 90 Id. at 389.  This passage was cited with approval in McConnell.  McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 143 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.). 
 91 “We all know that money is the chief source of corruption.”  McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 116 n.2 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.). 
 92 The Court noted that the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
“concluded that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and 
senior Government officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions.”  Id. at 
130 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.). 
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erosion of public confidence in the process.93  So low, apparently, is 
the level of scrutiny being applied to the provisions under review that 
even potential appearances94 and small likelihoods of occurrence95 
are adequate to justify campaign finance restrictions. 
This broad definition of corruption combined with a reduced 
level of scrutiny creates a dangerous double deference96 in which the 
evil to be demonstrated is so subjective and amorphous, and the level 
of proof so low that mere assertion (at least by Congressional experts) 
of the evil is tantamount to proof of the evil.  Add to that the irony of 
what might be called the new liar’s paradox in which the politician is 
trusted only to vouch for his own corruption.  This irony seems a slim 
reed on which to build the edifice of a constitutional campaign 
finance law. 
And so it is, for the ever expanding notion of corruption not 
only drives the law, but is in turn itself driven by an egalitarian 
participatory view of the values at issue here.  For although Buckley 
famously denied the relevance of equality interests in this context,97 
 
 93 The Court wrote: 
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the 
limited burden they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also 
reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution 
limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption threatened 
by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence 
in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.” 
Id. at 136 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)). 
 94 “Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence 
and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the 
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’”  Id. at 144 (opinion of 
Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 
(2000)). 
 95 “Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is 
manifest.  And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither 
easily detected nor practical to criminalize.  The best means of prevention is to 
identify and to remove the temptation.”  Id. at 153 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, 
JJ.). 
 96 I take the phrase “double deference” from Richard Epstein, who uses it in a 
different sense.  See Richard A. Epstein, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: 
A Deadly Dose of Double Deference, 3 ELECTION L.J. 231, 233 (2004) (observing that the 
first round of deference involves the “question of what it is that legislators . . . should 
do in the first place” while the second round of deference “arises in part because of 
the Supreme Court itself, which, in its relaxation of the protection of property rights 
and economic liberties, has created an unnecessary increase in the opportunities for 
politicians to trade on their office”). 
 97 “But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
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the more recent, broader concerns of the Court with access, 
influence, and large contributions arise out of a fear of the inequality 
they represent or threaten.98  The doctrinal and textual source of the 
goal of equality in campaign finance is the Equal Protection Clause,99 
rather than the First Amendment, or it is at least an egalitarian 
reading of the First Amendment.100  Most famously, the relation of 
equal protection to the electoral process appears in the “one person, 
one vote” standard of Reynolds v. Sims.101  All that the equal protection 
view of campaign finance reform seems to require is the small step of 
expanding “one person, one vote” from the act of voting itself to the 
whole electoral process, thus equalizing voters’ ability to influence 
election results indirectly by equalizing their ability to engage in 
electoral expression as well as their ability to influence results directly 
by casting their votes.  This would entail using weaker First 
Amendment standards for electoral expression than would apply to 
all other forms of protected speech. Advocates of this approach 
embrace this step under the title of “electoral exceptionalism.”102 
But electoral exceptionalism would be a step too far.  It would 
distort the constitutional concepts it now informs, would fail in its 
leveling purpose, and worst of all, would threaten popular self-
government and the censorial power.  One example of this distortion 
is manifested in the Court’s stretching of the notion of corruption 
beyond all recognition.103  An egalitarian reform of campaign finance 
would fail for two reasons.  First, as the McConnell Court itself admits, 
there is no reason to expect “that BCRA will be the last congressional 
statement on the matter.  Money, like water, will always find an 
outlet.”104  Second, even if all the leaks could be plugged, an 
egalitarian campaign finance utopia would not result.  Removal of big 
money from the process would only further enhance the not wholly 
benign influences of incumbents, celebrities, those with access to 
 
First Amendment . . . .”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
 98 For more on the relation of corruption and inequality, see generally Strauss, 
supra note 82, at 142–49. 
 99 “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 100 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975). 
 101 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  For a discussion linking Reynolds to the campaign finance 
context, see generally Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 
2474–76 (1997). 
 102 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the 
First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999). 
 103 See supra text accompanying notes 77–96. 
 104 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.). 
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volunteer labor, and the media, rather than equalize the voices of 
voters of all income levels.  Above all, though, the egalitarian drift of 
Court and commentators would imperil self-rule and the censorial 
power by, in Meiklejohn’s words, giving “subordinate agencies 
authority to abridge the freedom of the electoral power of the 
people.”105 
The egalitarian view of the First Amendment has not yet had its 
Justice Brennan or its New York Times v. Sullivan.  And if what has 
been argued here is persuasive, it never should.  For the allure of the 
egalitarian, managerial, and collectivist approach to electoral 
expression and campaign finance regulation is completely undercut 
by its incompatibility with the censorial power of the people and the 
central meaning of the First Amendment.  The error of this theory is, 
in fact, identical to that of the New York Times editorial writers in 
celebrating the electoral victory in December 2003 of parties 
supporting President Vladimir Putin over those supported by the rich 
oligarchs.106  Both views focus on and seek the limitation of private 
moneyed power in elections while completely overlooking, if not 
actually welcoming, the greater danger created by the governmental 
suppression of liberty, especially freedom of speech, needed to curb 
that private power. 
 
 
 105 Meiklejohn, supra note 64, at 254. 
 106 See supra text accompanying notes 20–26. 
